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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the evolving relationship between the 
British trading company John Swire and Sons and its Chinese partners involved in the 
distribution of its products, notably sugar. From the nineteenth century, Swire had 
utilised the Chinese system of the Comprador. The article identifies various 
weakness of the Comprador system from a management perspective but illustrates 
that, despite its evident shortcomings, Swire formally continued to recognise the 
system until the 1930s. However, in line with Jones’ notion of the adaptability of 
British trading companies, the paper concludes that significant changes in the 
corporate architecture of Swire had actually begun to be put in place from the early 
twentieth century. The emergence of a modern, managerially-based system of 
organisation in Swire before the 1930s suggests that the image of British trading 
companies as generally undynamic business institutions is of dubious validity.  
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It is hard to imagine any group of enterprises whose experience more perfectly 
mirrors Britain‟s economic history since 1800 than that of its commercial trading 
companies.  Propelled into the international economy largely as an outcome of the 
forces generated by the cotton textile revolution, firms such as Jardine‟s, John Swire 
& Sons, and James Finlay carried the mantle of Britain‟s mercantile power throughout 
the era known as Pax Britannica.
1
  Pre-eminent in international trade during the 
period from 1870 to 1914, for the most part these organisations failed to adjust to the 
challenges of the inter-war and post-war periods and eventually sank, along with the 
rest of Britain‟s colonial edifice, into oblivion. 
To this stark picture of rise and decline, however, has recently been added 
much valuable historical evidence and fresh reasoning.  In a detailed reappraisal of the 
economic history of Britain‟s trading firms, Geoffrey Jones has demonstrated that, in 
the case of a few of these companies, survival and renaissance - rather than decline 
and collapse - was the pattern that emerged, achieved through an ability to both 
accommodate and initiate change.
2
  Of course, this is not to argue that change came 
easily to Britain‟s trading companies, nor to deny that the majority failed to adapt and 
consequently perished.  Much of the competitive edge held by Britain‟s trading 
companies during their heyday accrued from the practical experience they had 
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gathered as a result of their foreign-based operations.  Location-specific knowledge of 
this kind possessed very little value outside of its immediate region and could quickly 
become redundant in the face of political upheaval or socio-economic realignments.  
Responding to change thus often required a process of re-evaluation and institutional 
reform that was inherently difficult to manage. The aim of the present paper is to 
consider a single example drawn from the group of trading firms who successfully 
„reinvented‟ themselves (to use Jones‟ term) in order to explore this process of reform 
both from the point of view of the individual firm and in relation to other firms that 
operated within the same environment - and who thus faced the same challenges - but 
whose origins lay outside the mercantile sector. 
Assessing analytically the process of trading companies‟ reform requires at the 
outset an appreciation of their internal and external architecture.
3
  In this respect it can 
be generally stated that the enterprises adopted a network form of organisation.
4
 
Initially, and at the simplest level, this merely involved a business partnership 
embracing a small number of merchants who were linked, almost invariably, by ties 
of kinship.  Even the highly complex „business groups‟ that grew up during the 
nineteenth century retained the character of extended family-based networks and were 
able to raise funds for expansion without needing to compromise their grip over 
managerial control.  Indeed, a key characteristic identified in the study by Jones is that 
successful reinvention by these firms was typically implemented within a governance 
structure that preserved family ownership and control.
5
 
The family character of the trading companies was also reflected in the 
relationships that they developed with other business enterprises.  For example, in 
terms of the ancillary services that they required - such as banking, shipping and 
insurance - whenever these functions were not performed internally they tended to be 
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undertaken by companies with whom they enjoyed a good long-term relationship.  As 
far as their operations abroad were concerned, individual merchant enterprises formed 
part of an expatriate community featuring a shared value system and joint 
membership of local institutions such as chambers of commerce and social clubs.  In 
addition, the trading companies established long-standing contacts with indigenous 
business elites, giving them in many cases a „quasi-local‟ status. These local contacts 
frequently provided the trading firms with an enduring source of competitive 
advantage. However, such reliance on trust-based relations with local firms also left 
the trading companies vulnerable to adverse shifts in relative bargaining strengths and 
opportunistic behaviour. Additionally, changes in the political or economic landscape 
could turn productive partnerships of this kind into liabilities. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, it was in relation to its external architecture that the process of reform 
among Britain‟s trading companies often tended to be most dramatic. 
Nowhere were such issues more pertinent during the first half of the twentieth 
century than in China. The Treaty Port system and the legal regime of 
extraterritoriality that had developed from the mid-nineteenth century constrained the 
geographical expansion of foreigners‟ activities and, together with the language 
barrier, made interfacing with the Chinese economy in general extremely problematic 
for British trading companies. To overcome these difficulties the western firms had 
employed intermediaries in the form of compradors, whose role involved both the 
management of Chinese native employees and mediation with Chinese merchants 
both within and beyond the Treaty Port economies. Over time the compradors became 
an integral part of the Chinese operations of trading firms, but during the twentieth 
century - especially after the revolution of 1911 - the political position of these 
intermediaries became more precarious. It has been shown, for example, that firms 
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whose principal activity lay in manufacturing or mining took advantage of the 
changing conditions within China to replace their compradors with managerial 
arrangements that facilitated more transparency and control over their Chinese staff.
6
  
Our purpose here is to utilise archive evidence and biographical testimony to consider 
how the British trading company of John Swire & Sons (JS&S) attempted to deal with 
the comprador question; specifically to ascertain the nature of the problems that the 
use of compradors engendered, how the firm dealt with them, and why a shift towards 
more modern managerial arrangements seem to have lagged behind those 
implemented by manufacturing multinationals active in China. 
 
II 
Like other trading companies operating out of Hong Kong and Shanghai, Butterfield 
& Swire (B&S, John Swire & Sons‟ Far East agent) relied heavily on their comprador 
in almost every aspect of business when dealing with Chinese. To understand the 
comprador system in Swire‟s, it is necessary to examine the types and functions of its 
compradors. First, there were general compradors, who took care of a wide range of 
business. The general compradors included chief compradors in the company‟s Hong 
Kong and Shanghai offices and out-port compradors in the branches in the Treaty 
Ports.  
Among all compradors, the chief compradors in Shanghai and Hong Kong 
played a pivotal role in the company‟s business. In Butterfield & Swire‟s entire 
history, there were only five general compradors in its Shanghai office and three in its 
Hong Kong office (Table 1). In the early stages of the Butterfield & Swire‟s 
operation, their responsibility, according to the first Shanghai comprador Cheng 
Kuanying, was „to secure shipping business, to manage godown and to load and 
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unload cargoes.‟7 When the company introduced the sugar and dockyard businesses in 
1881 and 1908 respectively, the sugar sales as well as the recruitment and supervision 
of the dockyard workers were also placed under the charge of the chief comprador. 
Because B&S had a very diversified range of businesses, it also had several 
function-specific compradors. Whilst initially the general comprador was the only 
business assistant to the company; following the establishment of the shipping and 
godown departments new compradors were added to the organisation. As late as the 
1920s, when the company believed that its existing compradors lacked sufficient 
competence to successfully develop its insurance business, it engaged an alternative 
Chinese native for the purpose. Thus, the Shanghai comprador Chun Shut Kai was felt  
by the London office of JS&S to be „useless‟ where insurance was concerned and 
another comprador, Hsi, was appointed to deal with this line of business.
8
 Although 
these function-specific compradors were directly responsible for certain part of the 
businesses, they were at the same time the assistants to the general comprador and 
played an integrated part in the operation of the comprador office.
9
 
In relation to these different types of compradors, it is helpful to summarise 
the functions of the compradors as a whole. Generally speaking, the functions of the 
comprador could be classified as house steward, treasurer, commission agent and 
upcountry purchaser, although there was no particular rule limiting his specific 
activities.
10
 These functions could be further divided into two categories based on the 
institutional status of the comprador: one was as managed employee while the other 
was as business intermediary. While acting as a house steward, the comprador was in 
charge of the housekeeping of a foreign firm, supervising and securing other Chinese 
servants in the house. As a treasurer, the duty of a comprador included receiving and 
taking charge of all moneys and securities for money coins, gold and silver, and 
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bullion native bills cheques and drafts.
11
 The comprador performing the functions as 
house steward or treasurer should be regarded as managed employee as far as his 
institutional status is concerned. 
On the other hand, the comprador should be regarded as a business 
intermediary when he performed the other two functions. When he served as a 
commission agent, his connection to the native merchant network was the key to 
promoting the business of foreign firm. Although the compradors received salary 
from foreign firms, this was done to a large extent in order to gain protection as a 
foreign employee when, in fact, they were merchants conducting business on behalf 
of their foreign principals.
12
 Another important function of the comprador, especially 
during the nineteenth century, was to buy Chinese produce (mainly tea and silk) from 
the interior. The comprador might receive funds in advance before each up-country 
trip and negotiate contracts with native merchants on the foreign firm‟s behalf. In 
other cases, the comprador simply acted as an independent merchant and drew up a 
contract with the company to supply export produce.
13
 
Although a comprador was usually multi-functional, the problems arising from 
his employment varied according to the primary functions such employees undertook. 
Cox and Chan
14
 noted that the employment of the comprador as an intermediary was 
more problematic and for many foreign companies this provided an impetus for 
reform. In the role of intermediary, the comprador had much more opportunity to 
engage in squeeze.
15
 Such problems were particularly serious when the comprador 
was responsible for the sales or purchase of commodities. In the non-trade service 
sector such as shipping, insurance or banking, the frequency of embezzlement and 
squeeze was lower than that in the produce trade business, where the possibility of 
own account dealing intensified the problem. 
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Most of the agreements drawn up with compradors contained a clause 
prohibiting unauthorised own account dealing. In Swire‟s case, contracts typically 
stipulated that: „The comprador shall be just and faithful to the Firm and shall devote 
all his entire time and continuous attention to their business…and shall not engage in 
any other calling business or pursuit or any kind of speculation without the previous 
consent in writing of the Firm.‟16 However, under the comprador system, there was no 
internal supervision mechanism through which the firm could effectively enforce such 
a clause. Rather, the operation of the system was based on the mutual trust between 
the foreign companies and their compradors. The comprador office was virtually 
separated from the foreign company and was thus commonly referred to as „a 
business within a business‟.17 Due to the language and cultural barriers and lack of 
key information, the foreign companies always found they had to rely heavily on the 
trustworthiness of their compradors. Although almost all compradors had to be 
financially guaranteed by means of securities and cash deposit, this could not prevent 
them from squeezing or cheating if they decided to do so.  
 
III 
The problems that Swire faced in their dealings with compradors can be perfectly 
illustrated by reference to the firm‟s developing business in the sugar industry. 
Swire‟s Taikoo Sugar Refinery (TSR) was first registered in 1882, when land was 
purchased from the Hong Kong government at Quarry Bay, and production 
commenced in 1884. The capital for the venture was put up by John Samuel Swire, 
Holt‟s James Barrow, H. J. Butterfield and others.18 John Swire & Sons in London 
and Butterfield & Swire in Hong Kong were appointed as joint agents for TSR until 
1914 when TSR was placed under the sole management of the former.
19
 JS&S, 
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represented by B&S in the Far East, made arrangements at outports for the purchase 
and sale of sugar,
20
 and had their own branches acting as sub-agents in such places. In 
return, JS&S was paid by TSR the sum of fifteen thousand pounds per annum to cover 
the cost of the general conduct of the mercantile business of the latter, brokerages and 
commissions incurred in the purchase and sale of sugar and ten percent of TSR‟s 
remaining profit.
21
 
Initially TSR faced severe competition from the earlier established sugar 
venture of Jardine Matheson & Co., but over time the two firms reached an 
accommodation
22
 and up until the early 1920s JS&S earned a good return on its 
capital invested.
23
 After this, however, difficulties began to mount as Japanese 
competition became increasingly destructive and the anti-British boycotts of the mid-
1920s curtailed demand for Taikoo‟s products. 
The success of the TSR up until the early 1920s should be partly attributed to 
the advanced production technology, which was kept strictly secret from outsiders 
including, notably, the company‟s sugar comprador.24 By 1925 Taikoo‟s Hong Kong 
plant had been expanded into the single largest sugar refinery in the world.
25
 In 
addition to its advanced production technology it also established a direct selling 
organisation upcountry, as will be explained in the following section. However, until 
the late-1920s, Swire‟s compradors continued to hold a significant position in the 
sugar distribution business, especially in South China which was not covered by the 
Swire‟s direct selling organisation. Swire‟s Shanghai management was certainly 
aware by the early 1920s that its compradors made a great profit out of their sugar 
dealing. In a letter to JS&S in London, dated November 1921, they explained that 
when the comprador hired coolies his profit margin was probably as high as 25 per 
cent although the comprador reported a margin of only 10 per cent and the company 
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found it difficult to refute this.
26
 However, the management in London seemed 
perfectly content, given the very high returns which were being earned by the refinery 
at that point, stating that „when the refinery prospers and if Shut Kai (its Shanghai 
comprador) has done his share of the work to help it to prosper, there is no earthly 
reason why he should not prosper with it.‟27 
However, there is evidence to show that the company were not fully aware of 
the extent of the sharp practices that were being used by their compradors to extract 
„squeeze‟. In his memoir Mok Ying Kui,28 whose father Mok Chou Cheung and 
brother Mok Kan Sang were both general compradors for B&S in Hong Kong, 
provides a detailed picture of the comprador system in Swire‟s. Being an assistant 
comprador and, from the 1930s the Chinese sugar manager, Mok‟s account provides 
much information that was not revealed in the company‟s archive. 
According to Mok, soon after the establishment of the TSR, sugar dealing had 
become the biggest business in the comprador office. However, the commission 
income, which should be regarded as the comprador‟s normal profit, was only a small 
percentage of the total income received.
29
 The largest slice of income came from 
zhazha - a Chinese word for squeeze. When the sugar market was booming, the office 
would buy the sugar from Taikoo under the name of different companies, and re-sell 
it in the market at a much higher price. When the market was slack, meanwhile, the 
comprador would operate only as an agent and earn commission, although sometimes 
he would store more inventories for future sales. The problem caused by the 
comprador‟s own account dealing could be illustrated by Mok Chou Cheung‟s 
business in Kwangtong. 
 Kwangtong was one of the major markets in China. Besides the sugar sold to 
the Cantonese sugar dealers by the comprador office in Hong Kong, a large amount of 
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sugar supplied to Kwangtong was through the Da Chan Zhan, a firm set up by Mok 
Chou Cheung in Canton. Using the name of Da Chan Zhan, Mok was able to 
purchase sugar from TSR when the market price was low and store it for re-sale when 
price went up. Typically, the sugar market in Kwangtong went through a well-defined 
annual cycle. The period between December and March was the production period of 
the native sugar factories, and during this period the sugar price was low due to the 
excessive supplies of the native sugar. In April and May the sugar price recovered 
gradually after the end of the native sugar production season, normally peaking at 
June due to the high sugar demand for moon cake production prepared for the Mid-
Autumn Festival. Then, after a small decline the sugar price would go up again in 
October and November, during the time when marriage ceremonies were most 
frequently arranged. With its special sugar go-down and storage equipment,
30
 Da 
Chan Zhan was able to speculate in the sugar market and the profit derived from price 
fluctuation would be tens of thousands Hong Kong Dollar per transaction, compared 
to the normal profit of several thousands HK$ per month.
31
 
Besides the finished sugar, a by-product of the sugar production—jushui, or 
sugar water, was another source of income for the comprador. Jushui was an 
important ingredient in the rice wine and soy sauce production and the demand was 
high in the Kwangtong area. As in the sugar business, Mok Chou Cheung supplied the 
jushui to the brewing factories through his comprador office, but also through several 
proxy companies on his own account, which bought the jushui from TSR at lower 
than market price and re-sold it at a significant profit. He also set up his own soy 
sauce factory - Tong Li Zhan - and utilising his position as Swire‟s comprador, this 
company was able to purchase jushui constantly at a very low price. Other examples 
of the comprador‟s opportunity to extract squeeze are illustrated in Mok‟s memoir. In 
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the early year of TSR‟s operation, the Cantonese jushui dealers once attempted to 
boycott Taikoo‟s sugar water to force the company to cut its price. Mok, on one hand, 
built a storage pool in Canton with huge capacity and attacked the boycotting dealers 
by developing new dealer networks in that area; at the same time, he forced the 
company to cut the jushui price by 20 per cent on the grounds of the boycott. In this 
way, he purchased all the jushui at the price of 20 per cent discount and re-sold it at a 
high market price. 
Mok Chou Cheung‟s other income source from the sugar business concerned 
the purchase of sugar bags. He established a company in Hong Kong - Chang Ji - 
which produced sugar bags with the raw materials purchased from Shouching and 
sold them to TSR at an inflated price. Interestingly, Mok Chou Cheung‟s son, Mok 
Kan Sang, who was Taikoo‟s comprador after 1917, was obliged to pay compensation 
of HK$ 250,000 to Swire‟s in 1929 owing to this earlier deception in the sugar bag 
purchase.
32
 Such compensation was as a settlement to B&S‟s claim that Mok Kan 
Sang brought a damage of HK$800,000 to the company when he purchased the sugar 
bags above the market price between 1920-1925.
33
 
According to Mok Ying Kui, his brother Mok Kan Sang made a much larger 
fortune out of the sugar business than his father had. Between 1917 to 1919, the first 
two years of Mok Kan Sang‟s compradorship, he built up inventories of sugar to 
between 80,000 - 100,000 bags (1 picul per bag).
34
 When, following the end of the 
First World War, the European countries eased price controls on sugar the result was 
a tenfold rise in the sugar price. Utilising such an opportunity, Mok‟s profit from 
sugar dealing was estimated at HK$ 5-6 million.
35
 Later, Mok spent more than HK$ 
one million on his new home at Kon No Dou, which was regarded as the most 
luxurious British-style palace in the whole of Hong Kong.
36
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The problems of squeeze by compradors in Swire‟s sugar business highlighted 
the disadvantages of the system. Overall, the comprador system was a costly 
arrangement for foreign companies and, as pointed by Hao, the comprador had 
become less of a bridge linking foreign businesses to the Chinese economy and more 
of a barrier to deeper Sino-foreign business interaction by the 1890s.
37
 Moreover, the 
problems involved were most serious in the produce trade business due to the high 
likelihood of own account dealing. Thus when the increasing importance of the sugar 
business drew Swire‟s attention to the problems of the old system, it was obliged to 
consider its reformation.  
 
IV 
As the drawbacks of the comprador system became more and more evident,  many 
foreign companies began to devise alternative systems of intermediation with the 
Chinese. By 1899, the Japanese Mitsui Company had dispensed with its compradors 
and, instead, trained their own staff in Chinese language skills. By using these staff in 
their transactions with Chinese merchants, they were able to capture a large share of 
the textiles market in China after 1900.
38
 In the early twentieth century, the local 
subsidiaries of the emerging Western multinational companies led the way in 
dispensing with the services of compradors. Companies such as British American 
Tobacco and Standard Oil established nation-wide sales system to distribute their 
products.
39
 In contrast, the trading companies remained wedded to their compradors 
throughout the 1920s, and in many cases beyond.
 40
  What it is important to recognise, 
however, is that within Swire a process of reform had effectively begun during the 
early years of the twentieth century.  Taking the path of least resistance, Swire began 
to implement a system of distribution for their sugar products which displayed many 
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common features with those of the more modern multinational corporations operating 
in China.  The difference lay more in the pace and magnitude of the changes rather 
than in the form that they took.  
As previously discussed, the compradors‟ role as intermediaries in the 
produce trade business was most problematic for the Western companies. In Swire‟s 
case, the sugar business was an area where the compradors‟ squeeze was common 
place. Not surprisingly, it was in this area that the company first introduced a direct 
selling system in 1906, at the time when many MNCs were beginning similar 
programmes. However, the introduction of the new system should be regarded as an 
experiment, which was originally confined to Manchuria. In July 1906, two main 
agencies in Moukden and Tiehling in the Newchwang Territory were established,
41
 
which marked the beginning of what became known as the „Manchuria system‟ of 
distribution. Unlike the traditional methods of selling through the sugar dealers in the 
Treaty Ports, „who played Swire‟s off against the Japanese to gain the best advantage 
for themselves‟,42 the new system allowed the company to appoint agencies on 
commission basis who were constrained to sell Taikoo sugar only. Besides the direct 
appointment of the agencies, the new system also involved periodical inspection of 
the agencies by European staff. 
Increasingly effective Japanese competition was one of the main forces that 
drove Swire to conduct such an experiment. In 1906, in one of his private letters to 
London, D. R. Law, B&S‟s Hong Kong manager, stated that the Japanese competition 
had a „disturbing influence‟ in the Chinese market and the „sugar position generally is 
not at all healthy in this part of the world.‟43  Due to the enormous Japanese influence 
in Manchuria, Swire was obliged to establish a new selling system there to retain its 
competitive position. Such a system had two advantages. First, since the sugar was 
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directly sold to the agents, the company was able to bring down distribution costs by 
circumventing the middleman‟s profit; second, with its own up-country agencies, the 
dependence on cliques of Chinese dealers could be avoided.
44
 The initial experiment 
was undoubtedly a success: the number of agencies in Manchuria increased to 15 in 
1910 while the total sugar stock taken by them increased from 26,507 piculs in 1908 
to 64,767 piculs in 1910.
45
 
The success of the Manchuria system inspired Swire‟s to extend its 
application to other parts of China. This is clearly demonstrated in a letter from 
Swire‟s London office to B&S Hong Kong in 1910. „Looking to the future all of us 
here feel convinced that it will be advisable, in the interests of the Refinery, to bring 
the Manchurian system into work as soon as possible in all parts of China, pushing 
our stuff through local agents and by regular foreign inspection keeping the run of 
what is doing.‟ It then went on, „we could not cover all the Empire with Taikoo 
agencies but we could well establish them in all leading marts of the populous parts 
exactly as has been successfully done in Manchuria.‟46 Swire‟s immediate plan was to 
apply the Manchuria System to the district along the Lu-Han Railway, which led to 
the opening of three agencies in the Tientsin Territory in the following year.
47
 
 The development of the upcountry selling organisation was gradual but 
relentless. In the 1910s Swire saw the number of its sugar agencies increased 
significantly. The merchants who were chosen as up-country representatives (agents) 
were usually the native hong, that had previously dealt in sugar or who already held a 
foreign agency in goods such as oil or tobacco. The company undertook to lay down 
the sugar in the agency godown, and all expenses thereafter were for the agent‟s 
account.
48
 The expansion of the agency network continued in the first half of 1920s, 
until the up-country selling organisation reached its peak in 1924. According to its 
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internal records, in 1924 Swire‟s had a total of 199 main agencies and 109 sub 
agencies located in 14 Chinese territories.
49
  
The company provided credit to the agents, although the credit terms in 
general were shorter than those customarily extended by one Chinese merchant to 
another.
50
 As a result, the financial standing of the prospective agent needed to be of a 
high order in the company‟s view and cash deposit or guarantor bonds were required. 
Any proposal to open a new centre had to be fully reported upon by an Inspector on 
the special Preliminary Report form. The company also felt that „it is extremely 
important that remittance of the proceeds due be carefully watched, as experience has 
proved that Agents do not hesitate to use in their own trading ventures funds which 
should be remitted‟.51 In order to check the unsold stocks and proceeds outstanding, 
and to watch the financial standing of its agents, Swire‟s developed a system of 
regular visits by an inspector of the company. The objective of the periodic inspection 
was also to keep close control of the business, investigate the market condition and to 
watch the general trend of trade in the district. The company employed inspection 
staff on a territory basis. There were a maximum 14 foreign inspectors and 13 
interpreters in total, allocated in 7 regions (Table 2).
52
 Also, the company summarised 
and standardised the inspection instruction and set the target frequency of visits at 
three per annum. In this way, foreign inspection became an effective system within 
the up-country selling organisation. 
The introduction of these supervisory systems, together with the direct 
appointment of agents, enabled the company to distribute its products in the vast 
Chinese market effectively and economically. The amount of sugar taken and 
distributed by the upcountry agents increased dramatically until the first half of 1920s. 
Figure 1 shows the total amount of sugar stock taken by all the company‟s upcountry 
 17 
agents from 1908 to 1928. The dramatic expansion of the upcountry selling 
organisation is evident. In 1908, all Swire‟s agents had been located in the 
Newchwang Territories and their sugar offtake was only 26,507 piculs, but by 1922 
the company had more than 300 agents located across most parts of China, who 
received stocks of sugar in excess of 1 million piculs.
53
 
The establishment of the up-country selling organisation meant that by the 
mid 1920s Taikoo sugar was marketed in China through two separate, but in some 
respects parallel, systems. In Kwangtong and Kwangsi provinces of South China, 
where no direct selling agencies were appointed, sugar sales were left exclusively in 
the charge of Swire‟s Hong Kong comprador, the Mok family. Elsewhere, although 
Mok continued to play a role in the distribution of Taikoo sugar,
54
 this was limited 
largely to acting as financial guarantors of the upcountry agents, in contrast to their 
traditional role as business intermediaries.
55
 
The gradual nature of the reformation program of the old comprador system 
was shown in other parts of the sugar business. Besides its traditional product of 
refined sugar, Swire‟s introduced a new product called carton candy in 1922. 
Although still relying on the compradors‟ service, concern about their malpractice 
was evident. In one correspondence, JS&S instructed its Far East agent B&S: „in 
order to avoid „squeeze‟ and irregularities we consider that it is essential that, 
wherever the packing is done, we should keep it under our own direct control. 
Similarly as regards selling you should retain the control and not delegate this entirely 
to the Comprador.‟56 
Consequently, the company attempted to introduce several safeguards to 
improve supervision and to prevent the comprador from obtaining squeeze. First, 
B&S in Hong Kong sought to fix the product‟s retail price and to have the price 
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marked on the cartons as a safeguard. In a letter to London it noted that the „Chinese 
are not going to pay 11 cents for what is marked 10 cents on the package, therefore 
we do not think, provided the price to distributors in the first instance leaves a fair 
margin of profit, that there can be much opportunity for squeeze‟.57 Swire‟s head 
office concurred, pointing out that „it should always be a condition of all sales to 
distributors that the retail price per carton must not exceed the price marked thereon, 
so that you can enforce observance of the condition if you discover that it is not 
observed.‟58 
Second, the company attempted to develop a mechanism of European 
supervision, especially for the packing of the carton candy. Swire‟s London office felt 
that the business should from the start be understood to be controlled by the Refinery 
and European supervision would be a necessity.
59
 This idea initially received 
opposition from Butterfield and Swire in China. B&S (Hong Kong) wrote to the 
company‟s branch in Shanghai stating that „this of course cannot be arranged for by 
our regular B&S sugar staff, even if we had the men to spare, as it is hardly work that 
could be delegated to them... Our feeling is that Shut Kai should be “given his 
hand”.‟60 However, under pressure from the London office B&S in a later 
correspondence agreed that „this [packing] presents no difficulties here and could 
easily be supervised by our present staff.‟61 
The third measure that the company took was to introduce a new 
remuneration system for the comprador in the carton candy business. Traditionally, 
the comprador received his commission on the basis of gross sales revenue. However, 
in the carton candy business, the comprador to some extent acted as the company‟s 
local partner and was remunerated by 25 per cent percent of the net profit.
62
 The 
comprador bought the sugar candy from TSR at current price and arranged for 
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packing and selling (under European supervision). As a result, it was the best interest 
of the company to have him work on a percentage of the net profit, rather than on the 
value of sales, so as to have his co-operation in keeping down cost and to reduce the 
incentive for squeeze.
63
 
In effect, the carton candy business operated like a joint venture between 
TSR and its comprador. The company provided premises at Watung and supplied 
candy for packing while Shut Kai, its Shanghai comprador recruited foreman and 
workers to carry out the actual packing work. Both of them worked closely on the 
design of the carton, the determination of the size of the package and the price of the 
product; the net profit allocated between them was 75 per cent and 25 per cent 
respectively.
64
  
As with other sugar products, carton candy was also sold through both of the 
comprador and Swire‟s upcountry agent. At the beginning, B&S in Hong Kong 
expected that „in addition to the numerous boys he would employ at street corners, 
railway stations, etc, Shut Kai would also arrange with several shops, or distributors, 
to handle these cartons and sell to the hawker class.‟65 Nevertheless, at the later stage 
almost all 300 of Swire‟s upcountry agent handled the sales of carton candy, but it is 
not clear how much stock the agents took in total.
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The parallel systems of comprador and direct selling worked quite well for 
Swire. Although the company continued to rely on its comprador‟s service until early 
1930s, the establishment of an upcountry selling organisation as well as the 
introduction of a more effective monitoring and incentive mechanism significantly 
increased its competitiveness in the sugar market. In contrast to its rival, the China 
Sugar Refinery Co. of Jardine Matheson that went into liquidation in 1928, TSR was 
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able to weather the market disorder, political disturbance and cut-throat Japanese 
competition in the 1920s.
67
  
 
V 
In the produce trade business where the comprador‟s service proved to be most 
problematic, Swire‟s was able to establish an alternative distribution system without 
much resistance from their compradors. The problem of „squeeze‟, although 
unavoidable, was therefore diluted. On the other hand, the reformation of the 
comprador‟s system in other areas of Swire‟s business only began later and the 
compradors still played a prominent role in activities such as shipping, warehousing 
and insurance throughout the 1920s. In fact, as late as 1928 there is evidence to 
indicate that Swire‟s still viewed compradors as the mainstay of their Chinese 
business system. Although it was recognised that „as the emancipation of China 
proceeds, the old order of things will pass, and quite possibly the comprador system 
with it‟, certain sentiments within the company still reflected the view that „for the 
time being, the modern Western-educated Chinese have yet to prove themselves 
substantial men of business‟.68  
Nevertheless, during the late 1920s Swire‟s did begin to bring more Western-
educated Chinese into its organisation, heralding the formal abolition of the 
comprador system in the following decade. The direct employment of Chinese 
managerial staff was first introduced in the insurance business, where salesmen with a 
degree of professional knowledge were required. The experience was prompted by the 
study of the methods of some American companies, whose competition seriously 
challenged Swire‟s position in the insurance market.69 These American insurance 
companies did not work through the conventional comprador and agent type of 
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arrangement, but through foreign educated Chinese who were members of their own 
staff, and held titles such as Branch or Departmental Manager. Swire‟s management 
recognised that the old comprador type „could not stand up to the youngsters when it 
came to actively seeking business‟ and under the new arrangement, „a close(r) watch 
could possibly be kept on „squeeze‟ than would ever be practicable with compradors 
and agents.‟70 Consequently, in late 1920s, the company sought to „employ on our 
staff foreign educated youngsters who, after some training, are placed in charge of 
developing Chinese business, rather than try to introduce men as Insurance 
Compradors.‟71  
In 1928, Butterfield and Swire (Shanghai) brought its Tientsin insurance 
comprador‟s son into the insurance office for training; a move that was actively 
encouraged by Swire‟s London office. B&S was advised to repeat this process with 
junior members of the Chinese outport staffs, who showed signs of keenness and 
aptitude for the insurance work.
72
 These trained men were to be treated as „Chinese 
members of the Insurance Department - not as members of the comprador‟s staff or 
the ordinary Chinese staff or as brokers - who are posted to ports, just as the foreign 
members are.‟73 Moreover, with the wider employment of Chinese, the company 
proposed the following possible development:
74
 
a) A Chief Chinese Inspector whose function would be to control the 
business getting organisation, visiting Chinese agents all over the country, 
either in company with a foreigner or otherwise; 
b) Chinese District Inspectors made up of men trained in the insurance 
department, and having a seat in an agent‟s hong at some particular point, 
and responsible for two or three towns in the neighbourhood. 
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The Chief and District Inspector were to be placed in Shanghai and the Main 
ports respectively. These staff were young Chinese of good standing and education, 
with proper training from the company and receiving good salary.
75
 In this way, the 
company sought to command a larger share of business than the comprador‟s 
departments and their up-country agents were able to procure and to remain firmly 
established and prominent in every respect as the largest insurance interests in the 
country.
76
 
At the same time, the company gradually reclaimed sensitive areas of business 
from the compradors‟ control as another part of its reformation scheme. The 
responsibility of Butterfield and Swire‟s comprador office in Hong Kong reflected 
this point. After B&S (Hong Kong) claimed a compensation of HK$ 800,000 against 
its comprador Mok Kan Sang in 1928, the company significantly cut down the 
business in the charge of its Hong Kong comprador office.
77
 Before the case, almost 
all the businesses were conducted by this office. However, after several adjustments, 
the businesses remaining under the comprador office‟s charge was only the marine 
insurance, the warehouse of the CNCo and part of the sugar business.
78
 As far as the 
sugar distribution is concerned, the geographic area that the office served was 
significantly reduced. Before 1930, Swire‟s comprador office in Hong Kong supplied 
sugar to the market in the China mainland together with the company‟s other local 
branches; after 1930, it was prohibited to directly sell to the North China market and 
its remaining market area was only two provinces: Kwangtong and Kwansi. 
The establishment of the up-country sales organisation, the employment of 
Western-educated Chinese and the reduction of reliance on compradors laid down the 
foundation for the complete abolition of the comprador system. In 1931, when 
Butterfield and Swire‟s Hong Kong comprador Mok Kan Sang resigned from his 
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position, the company accepted it without much hesitation and disbanded the 
comprador office in Hong Kong. His brother, Mok Yinkui, was subsequently 
appointed as Chinese manager in B&S‟s sugar department.79 Thereafter, Swire‟s 
started to appoint more of its former compradors as Chinese managers and to embrace 
them into the managerial hierarchy. From the record of the compradors‟ security 
bonds for the period of 1904-1941,
80
 it can be seen that the first four Chinese 
managers in Mainland China were appointed in 1932. They were Hankow godown 
manager Yang Che Kiang, Tientsin godown manager Li Hao Chuen, insurance 
comprador Hsi San Fang and shipping manager Lo Yew Ting. When Swire‟s 
reformed its comprador system into a Chinese manager system during the 1930s, 
there were strong continuities between the two. For example, the contracts of the 
comprador and the Chinese managers had great similarity, however, one major 
difference was that while compradors had to make full compensation to Swire‟s if 
their customers did not fulfil their obligations, the Chinese manager‟s responsibility 
was only „to mediate whole-heartedly‟.81 In this sense, the reformation was 
incomplete and some have argued that the only motive for such change was to give 
these staff „face‟ with their countrymen.82 
Nevertheless, by appointing the compradors as Chinese managers and placing 
them within the company hierarchy, the company was able to secure more effective 
control over their activities. Moreover, there was a fundamental change concerning 
the status of the Chinese employee, which differentiated the two systems. While under 
the comprador system all Chinese employees were employed and controlled by the 
comprador, under the new system they were employed directly by Swire.
83
 Such an 
arrangement enabled the company to directly control its staff and thus disband the 
comprador office as an independent kingdom. After mid-1930s, no more compradors 
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were appointed and the former compradors were gradually integrated into the 
company‟s management structure. By doing so, Swire‟s was able to smoothly replace 
the old comprador system by a Chinese Managers system. 
Generally speaking, the gradual reforming model adopted by Swire‟s had 
two advantages. First, there was less friction in the gradual reformation process 
compared to the „big bang‟ model since there was less opposition from the 
compradors and it gave the old-style Chinese merchants time for adaptation. Second, 
less financial and human resources were required since the company could continue to 
utilise the existing organisation and its compradors‟ business ability; while in the case 
of MNCs, to replace the compradors‟ personal contact by a nation-wide sales 
hierarchy demanded much more intensive investment. Although the radical reform 
carried out by MNCs, backed by enormous financial investment, provided them with 
satisfactory achievement, the gradual reform undertaken by Swire‟s also enabled it to 
operate in a modern institutional setting and to compete more effectively in the 
Chinese market. 
 
VI 
The comprador system can be seen to have constituted a much more deeply ingrained 
element in the evolution of the nineteenth century British trading firms than it did in 
the more modern forms of international business enterprise that came to the fore in 
China during the twentieth century.  This fact has helped to support a view that firms 
such as Swire were reluctant to jettison the system despite its evident shortcomings, 
reinforcing the idea that trading firms in general were less dynamic than the newly-
emerging multinational corporations.
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 In fact, a detailed study of Swire‟s approach to the comprador issue after 1900 
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reveals a far more complex picture.  Whilst it is true that the comprador system was 
formally retained until the decision to abolish the offices in Hong Kong and Shanghai 
in the early 1930s, it would certainly not be accurate to portray this as a policy of 
inaction. As early as 1906 a system of distribution began to be set up for the 
company‟s sugar business based on sole agency contracts with independent Chinese 
merchants.  Pioneered by Swire in Manchuria - where the writ of the traditional 
comprador was weakest - this direct sales system was further extended between 1915 
and 1924 to cover much of mainland China outside of the southernmost provinces.  
As such, it provided the Taikoo refinery in Hong Kong with a method of distribution 
that was in many respects similar to that developed by the thrusting multinational 
companies of Britain and America. 
 The introduction of a system of Chinese agents certainly reduced Swire‟s 
reliance on its compradors in terms of its sugar business, and helped to provide a 
period of very rapid growth in sales.  However, the boycotts and political turmoil of 
the second half of the 1920s, along with rapidly growing competition from Japanese 
producers, badly affected the financial performance of Swire‟s agency system. The 
decision to concentrate its refining capacity in a single location - Hong Kong - 
exacerbated the difficulties of economic and political dislocation that undermined its 
up-country sales structure after 1925.  In 1927 the company felt it had no alternative 
but to close down its refinery and by late 1928 the company had curtailed all of its 
agency contracts.   When the refinery was eventually reopened in 1929, Swire was 
forced to revert to the comprador networks in a bid to maintain a market for its 
products, which it did by appointing the leading compradors as sugar managers. 
However, its problems were compounded when the Nationalist government 
introduced a tariff on imported sugar products in 1931 since Hong Kong lay outside 
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the boundary circumscribed by the duty.  Thereafter, Taikoo looked increasingly 
outside of China for a market for its sugar. 
 By this time, however, Swire had experimented with a variety of alternative 
methods aimed at overcoming the problems generated by the operation of the 
comprador system.  In the carton candy business, improved forms of monitoring, 
accountability and remuneration had been introduced to the combat the age-old 
problem of squeeze.  In this, and in its other activities such as insurance and shipping, 
the company gradually began to revise the nature of Anglo-Chinese business relations 
into more integrated forms.  The ultimate shift in corporate culture, therefore, can thus 
been seen as the appointment of Chinese managers and the final abolition of the 
offices of the comprador during the first few years of the 1930s.  Hence, by the time 
of the Second World War, Swire had gone a long way towards transforming both its 
internal and external architecture through the development more modern, 
managerially-based system of organisation.  To be  sure, those changes crystallised 
during the 1930s; but this was the culmination of a process of gradual reform whose 
origins should been seen as beginning no less than a quarter of a century earlier. 
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Table 1. General Compradors in Swire, 1870-1949 
Shanghai Hong Kong 
Comprador period comprador period 
Cheng Kuan Ying 1873-1881 Mok See Yong 1870-1879 
Yang Kui Shan 1882-1884 Mok Chou Cheung 1879-1917 
Chun Koo Leong  1884-1920 Mok Kan Sang 1917-1931 
Chun Shut Kai 1920-1935   
Chun Kult Cho
1
 1935-1949   
 
(Source: Zhang et al, Swire Group, pp. 153, 55) 
 
                                               
1 Chun Kult Cho operated under the title of godown manager after 1937 (Swire papers, JSSI 8/3, 
Agreement between Chun Kult Cho and B&S, 1/1/1937) 
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Table 2.  Sugar Inspector in TSR’s up-country selling organisation 
 
(Source: JSSV 6/3, 14/8/29, TSR up country selling organisation) 
  
A chief inspector, based on Shanghai
Territories foreign inspectorsinterpretors H. Q.
shanghai two two Shanghai
Ningbo
Nanking two two Nanking
Chekiang
Wuhu one one Wuhu
Kiukiang one one Kiukiang
Hankow three three Hankow
Changsha
Tientsin
Tsingtao three three Tientsin
Chefoo
Manchuria one one harbin  
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(Source: JSSV 6/3, 14/8/29, Statement III, list of Agencies) 
 
Figure 1: John Swire & Sons’ Total Up-country Offtake of Sugar, 1908-28 
(Piculs)  
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